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Overview of Emerging Militias
Over the past several months, a growing patchwork of anti-Hamas armed groups has surfaced across Gaza, fundamentally reshaping the dynamics inside the enclave. These groups, once operating quietly or in isolated pockets, have now become visible power centers within the 53% of Gaza currently controlled by Israeli forces. As global attention turns toward the Gaza armed groups peace plan, these factions are increasingly vocal about their desire for recognition, legitimacy, and a formal role in the region’s next political chapter.
The militias vary significantly in size, structure, and motivation. Some are tied to long-standing family clans, others emerged from criminal networks, while several were formed as newly organized paramilitary units with direct or indirect support from Israel. Many of these groups operate autonomously in their local zones, enforcing security, distributing supplies, and exerting influence over displaced communities.
The presence of these militias is not new, but their sudden empowerment is. Israel’s ongoing operations against Hamas have created a vacuum—and these new formations have filled it, capitalizing on the disruption to Hamas’ control. This realignment has raised major questions about the future of governance in Gaza and whether these forces will help stabilize or destabilize the region when the war ends.
Links to Israel, PA, and Foreign Actors
One of the most controversial elements surrounding these militias is their range of alliances. While Israeli officials have repeatedly hinted at coordination with certain groups, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently acknowledged that Israel has backed some militias—sparking intense debate.
“What’s wrong with it? It saves soldiers’ lives,” Netanyahu said, defending the strategy. He argued that supporting local groups opposing Hamas is a pragmatic decision, though he insisted the disclosure of such support “only helped Hamas.”
Meanwhile, elements within the Palestinian Authority (PA) are believed to be covertly assisting specific anti-Hamas factions. This reflects a long-standing political rivalry, as the PA seeks to regain influence in Gaza after years of marginalization under Hamas’ rule.
International actors are also involved, though often behind the scenes. Some militia leaders claim to be coordinating with American representatives overseeing aspects of the proposed peace plan. While U.S. officials deny confirming future roles for any domestic militia, multiple commanders assert they have engaged in “encouraging discussions.”
Militia Leaders Position Themselves for Future Control
Many of these militia leaders see themselves as future kingmakers in the post-Hamas era. Yasser Abu Shabab, leader of the Popular Forces militia operating near Rafah, has openly discussed coordinating with the Board of Peace—the international entity expected to administer Gaza under the U.S.-backed plan.
In another part of southern Gaza, Hossam al-Astal leads the Counter-Terrorism Strike Force. His group is smaller—likely just a few dozen fighters—but is rapidly gaining influence due to its highly organized infrastructure. Al-Astal boasts well-supplied tent cities that offer shelter, food, and relative safety for families who fled Hamas-controlled areas.
“We are the next day for the new Gaza,” al-Astal told reporters. He says his fighters are ready to integrate into a future Palestinian police force—pending approval from international mediators. “We have no problem cooperating with the Palestinian Authority, with the Americans, or anyone who aligns with us. We are the alternative to Hamas.”
Public Backlash Among Gazans
Despite the militias’ growing visibility, many Gazans are deeply uncomfortable with their rise. Critics warn that these disparate groups are not accountable to any unified command structure and may undermine long-term stability.
“Only a small number of men who have no religion, faith, or ethics have joined these criminals,” said Gaza City resident Saleh Sweidan. “Any government is better than gangs.”
Others fear that collaboration with Israeli forces—whether real or perceived—risks branding these groups as traitors. “These groups that cooperate with the occupation are the worst thing the war has produced,” said another resident, Zaher Doulah.
Even those who seek refuge under militia protection face criticism. One resident, Montaser Masoud, who relocated his family to al-Astal’s camp, says he is constantly judged.
“My relatives say what we’re doing is wrong,” he said. “But they live outside the Yellow Line, where Hamas fighters can hide near them. They could be bombed at any time.”
Complex Ties: Crime, Clans, and Ideological Factions
While some militias present themselves as disciplined security forces, others have reportedly engaged in criminal activity. Abu Shabab’s Popular Forces, for example, have been accused of looting humanitarian aid trucks. Israeli media reports also suggest that two members of his militia previously had ties to Islamic State (IS).
“This is the same risk the Americans took in Afghanistan 30 years ago,” warned Michael Milshtein, former head of Palestinian affairs for Israeli military intelligence. “Israel may be empowering a future enemy.”
Experts note that loosely regulated militias can evolve unpredictably. Today’s ally can rapidly become tomorrow’s adversary—particularly in an environment where political legitimacy and survival often depend on shifting alliances and access to resources.
Debate Over Militia Integration Under the Peace Plan
A central aspect of the Gaza armed groups peace plan is the creation of a newly trained Palestinian police force and an International Stabilization Force. However, U.S. officials have not indicated that any current Gaza militias will receive formal roles.
Major General Anwar Rajab, spokesperson for the Palestinian Authority’s security forces, firmly rejected claims that militias like al-Astal’s would be integrated. “Israel might demand their integration for its own political or security considerations,” he told the BBC, “but Israel’s demands do not necessarily benefit the Palestinians.”
Analysts warn that arming disparate groups now may make it harder to persuade Hamas to disarm—or convince international troops to step in later. Israel’s history of supporting militant rivals to counter stronger adversaries has not always ended well. Hamas itself splintered from earlier factions Israel once tolerated.
“The risk is that the same groups Israel arms today could become the threat it faces tomorrow,” Milshtein cautioned.
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By The News Update Team — Updated November 21, 2025