India marked 25 years since becoming a nuclear weapon power in May 2023, a milestone that highlights both the progress and pressing challenges in its nuclear strategy. Despite the passage of a quarter-century since the historic Shakti nuclear tests, India’s nuclear doctrine remains a work in progress. With rising nuclear tensions in South Asia — especially China’s erosion of its No First Use (NFU) policy and Pakistan’s advancing tactical nuclear capabilities — the need for Delhi to revisit and revise its nuclear posture is more urgent than ever.
1. China’s Ambiguous Nuclear Stance Threatens Regional Stability
China’s recent silence and de facto abandonment of its NFU policy, combined with its expansive nuclear modernization, signals a significant shift in regional power dynamics. According to Carnegie Endowment, this ambiguity poses a direct challenge to India’s deterrence strategies, especially along the contested Line of Actual Control (LAC).
2. India’s Existing Nuclear Doctrine Is Ambiguous and Outdated
India’s draft nuclear doctrine of 1999 and its 2003 clarifications emphasize credible minimum deterrence and NFU but leave many strategic questions unanswered. The reluctance to update these policies has left India vulnerable to new threats and strategic uncertainties.
3. The Paradox of Credible Minimum Deterrence Against Both China and Pakistan
As nuclear expert Vipin Narang explains, India cannot simultaneously maintain a “credible minimum deterrent” against two very different adversaries — China and Pakistan. This paradox forces India to prioritize, complicating its nuclear posture and force structure.
4. Questioning the Effectiveness of the No First Use (NFU) Policy
The NFU policy, while morally and diplomatically appealing, has significant operational challenges. For instance, in a conventional conflict, Indian forces may unintentionally target nuclear sites, raising questions about whether NFU would constrain India’s response. Furthermore, China’s territorial claims in Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh undermine the applicability of its NFU pledge against India.
5. The Challenge of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs)
Pakistan’s development of TNWs with ranges as short as 60 kilometers, designed for battlefield use, presents a new dilemma. A massive retaliation to a tactical nuclear strike would be disproportionate and potentially catastrophic. India must consider proportionate response options, including its own tactical nuclear capabilities, complicating the current doctrine.
6. Decision-Making Authority and Battlefield Realities
India’s doctrine centralizes nuclear authorization with the Prime Minister. However, TNWs may require rapid battlefield decisions by military commanders, raising questions about the feasibility of the current command and control structures during a multi-front conflict.
7. The Need for a Dynamic and Flexible Nuclear Strategy
Given evolving threats, India must adopt a more flexible and responsive doctrine that balances moral commitments with strategic realities. Think tanks like the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) have advocated shifting from “minimum” to “minimal” deterrence, allowing for adaptive force sizing in response to changing threats.
How Should Delhi Respond?
India must urgently initiate a comprehensive review of its nuclear doctrine that:
- Reassesses the relevance and applicability of the No First Use policy in the current geopolitical context.
- Develops clear guidelines for tactical nuclear weapons and proportional retaliation.
- Enhances command and control frameworks to accommodate rapid battlefield decision-making.
- Maintains credible deterrence against both China and Pakistan with a flexible approach.
- Incorporates technological advancements such as missile defense and indigenous thorium technology.
Failure to update the doctrine risks India’s strategic security and regional stability. As threats evolve, so must India’s nuclear posture.
And if we really go with our TNWs, then there will be a new problem. By their very nature, the TNWs and their eventual uses are better determined on the spot, that is, on the battlefield, by the military commanders concerned. How, then, will that go with our strict provision that only the Prime Minister will decide when and where to use our nuclear weapons?
All these are very tricky but vital questions. But answers to them cannot wait anymore. The Indian government should not sit over them.
Explore More
For deeper insights on India’s defense strategy and nuclear posture, read:
- India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Challenges and Way Forward
- Nuclear Deterrence and Its Future in South Asia
- India-Pakistan Nuclear Tensions and Ceasefire 2025
